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ABSTRACT 
After more than seven years of funding through The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, local public health agencies have made inconsistent progress in fulfilling 
their Homeland Security objectives.  Most progress has been made in those areas in 
which Public Health has previous experience, such as disease surveillance.  However, in 
those activities requiring integration with other responder agencies, such as fire and 
police agencies, Public Health has lagged in developing effective capabilities in 
prevention, preparedness, response, mitigation and recovery.  This thesis argues that 
several factors contribute to this lack of success, including funding structures and 
guidelines, the reluctance on the part of other responder agencies to include Public Health 
in emergency planning and response activities, and the organizational isolation in which 
Public Health has existed for the past several decades. Moreover, a pervasive 
organizational culture has developed within Public Health that reduces its ability to 
correct these problems.   
In order for local public health agencies to meet their Homeland Security 
objectives, funding structures and guidelines must support local Public Health, and public 
health agencies must be better integrated with their Homeland Security partners.  Public 
health agencies at all levels, and their leadership, have the opportunity to effect 
organizational changes designed to accelerate the transformational process, enhancing 
their Homeland Security partnerships.  Public Health agencies can more effectively 
integrate into the larger Homeland Security community by demonstrating a commitment 
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Since the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ 1999 
Bioterrorism Initiative, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
designated as the lead agency to improve the nation’s public health capacity to respond to 
bioterrorism, has provided grant funding to state public health agencies for bioterrorism 
preparedness and response activities.1  This funding, in part, may be passed through to 
local public health agencies to build infrastructure and response capacity.  
However, in spite of diligent efforts by local public health agencies to build 
emergency capacity, they continue to be frustrated in fulfilling their Homeland Security 
objectives by both internal and external factors. These factors include barriers from 
funding structures to organizational cultural issues.  While funding at the state level has 
produced improvements, such as increased laboratory and disease surveillance capacity, 
the burden of Public Health preparedness and response responsibilities remains at the 
local level where emergencies occur and must be responded to appropriately.   
This thesis maintains the premise that local public health agencies are the first line 
of emergency Public Health response.  Since 1999, public health agencies nationwide 
have made progress in improving Public Health infrastructure in specific areas, such as 
disease surveillance, which relate to the health initiatives in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security.  However, they continue to meet with limited and inconsistent 
success in grant activities that require collaboration with other agencies involved in 
Homeland Security activities.2  Arizona Public Health is used throughout this thesis in 
examples of Public Health progress in developing emergency capacity. 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement funding 
originated due to the perceived threat of a bioterrorism incident, within the United States, 
                                                 
 
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Initiative, Overview and General Information About the Initiative, Prepared by the Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Program, National Center for Infectious Diseases, May 8, 2000. 
2 Highlights of GOA-04-458T, Public Health Preparedness, Response Capacity Improving, but Much 
Remains to be Accomplished.  February 2004.  
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that will require immediate and effective response by public health agencies.  Ultimately, 
there will be significant negative consequences to the United States if local public health 
agencies are unable to effectively plan for and respond to emergency incidents.  
Recognizing that there are Public Health consequences to virtually any natural or 
intentional emergency incident, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in its 
2005-2006 Cooperative Agreement funding, extended its expectations of public health 
agencies to include response to all types of emergency incidents, effectively making 
public health agencies “All-Hazards” responders.  However, local public health agencies 
must be able to effectively utilize these grant monies if they are to build emergency 
capacity. 
This thesis argues that multiple factors contribute to the difficulties Public Health 
is having in meeting its Homeland Security obligations.  First, Public Health funding 
structures must ensure that local public health agencies are fully supported in meeting 
their Homeland Security objectives.  Because local Public Health emergency capacity is 
vital to meeting state and federal objectives, funding passed from the federal level 
through states to local public health agencies must be adequate, timely, and include 
appropriate guidelines to avoid inconsistent results nationwide and to allow local Public 
Health capacity building. 
A second barrier to local public health agency success is the reluctance of other 
responder agencies, such as fire, emergency management, and law enforcement, to 
include public health agencies in various preparedness and response activities.  Although 
this reluctance may be quickly overcome in a major emergency such as Hurricane 
Katrina, it poses barriers for Public Health in preparing to be a response partner before 
major incidents occur.  Part of this reluctance may be due to Public Health culture being 
different from responder agencies.  There may also be some reluctance due to the 
crossover of Public Health activities into what has been traditionally perceived as 
emergency management activities.  For example, local Public Health is involved heavily 
in volunteer recruitment, training, and management activities as a result of planning for 
mass dispensing of medications or vaccine.  
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An outcome of the disparate cultures and lack of experience between public 
health agencies and other responder agencies is the reluctance of some responder 
agencies to actively invite public health agencies to participate in emergency planning 
and response activities.  Public health agencies may be viewed as inexperienced in 
dealing with emergencies, naïve, unknowledgeable, and difficult to communicate with.  
However, even if public health agencies work to overcome their culture barriers, unless 
other responder agencies become inclusive of them, barriers to collaborative and 
cooperative response will remain.  If other responder agencies will not voluntarily 
include Public Health in the responder community, they will need to be motivated to 
include public health agencies in emergency preparedness and response activities. 
Last, public health agencies have been organizationally isolated from other 
agencies for several decades and have developed organizational cultures that, while 
benign in fulfilling Public Health core activities, pose barriers to accomplishing 
objectives requiring integration of Public Health into the Homeland Security community.  
This isolation has contributed to deeper, problematic organizational behaviors that 
perpetuate the isolation of Public Health from other responder agencies.  Public health 
agencies must actively find ways to change communication and decision making 
characteristics that hinder effective collaboration with other responder agencies while 
focusing preparedness funding on activities that contribute to meeting Homeland Security 
objectives. 
Public health agencies must actively transform their cultures in ways that will 
allow them to adapt quickly to the Homeland Security environment or they will not be 
able to timely meet their Homeland Security obligations.  This thesis will examine the 
ways in which police and fire agencies have evolved to meet changing community needs 
by diversifying activities.  Other response agencies — especially fire and law 
enforcement agencies — have evolved in organizational environments in which they 
interact regularly with other responder agencies. While having agency-specific cultural 
traits, these responder agencies have also developed strategies that usually allow them to 
bridge interagency gaps and function in a more diverse responder community while 
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fulfilling their changing roles.  By modeling some of these strategies, public health 
agencies can make effective changes to better fulfill their Homeland Security objectives.   
This thesis suggests several policy initiatives as strategies for accelerating the 
needed changes in local public health agencies.  These initiatives are directed at different 
levels — from federal funding to local training initiatives — to support local Public 
Health in developing effective emergency capacities and to assist them in integrating into 
the Homeland Security community.  As federal funding dollars become less available, it 
is critical to effect immediate changes within Public Health that will best utilize available 













II. PUBLIC HEALTH ROLES IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. BACKGROUND 
Public Health is uniquely suited to engage in accomplishing certain goals within 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  These goals include participation in: 1) 
Detection of chemical and biological materials and attacks, 2) Preparing health care 
providers for catastrophic terrorism, 3) Augmenting America’s public pharmaceutical and 
vaccine stockpile, 4) Building the Citizen Corps, and, 5) Ensuring reliable public health 
information.3  For this reason, Public Health is needed to take an active role in the 
Homeland Security community.  
Public Health began in the 1600s in the United States primarily to address water 
quality and sanitation issues.4   Gebbie notes that Public Health has changed from “the 
absence of diagnosable disease to a state of well-being to the inclusion of the capacity to 
live and work in a community.5  Public Health authorities addressed the control of 
specific diseases, such as polio in the 1950s6, and smallpox, which was eradicated in the 
late 1970s.  Both of these diseases are examples of acute events in which public health 
agencies were required to respond quickly and effectively to eradicate health threats.  
Over time, in the absence of true emergency health threats, Public Health began to 
address other health issues of a less acute nature.  Current Public Health responsibilities 
include vaccinations, injury prevention, workplace safety, infectious disease 
investigations and control, chronic disease (such as cancer) surveillance and 
investigation, food and environmental safety, mother and child health, family planning 
services, water fluoridation, and tobacco use.  Few current public health activities require 
                                                 
 
3 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002. 
4 Eileen Salinsky, Senior Research Associate, “Public Health Emergency Preparedness:  Fundamentals 
of the System.”  NHPF Background Paper, National Health Policy Forum, The George Washington 
University, April 3, 2002. 
5 Kristine M. Gebbie, “The History of Public Health,” Columbia School of Nursing, New York, NY.  
6 Edmund Sass, “A Polio Timeline,” in Polio’s Legacy: An Oral History, 1996. 
http://www.cloudnet.com/%7Eedrbsass/poliotimeline.htm, accessed May 31, 2004. 
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immediate response or interagency coordination. Exceptions to this are communicable 
disease investigations and food, environmental, and water safety. The planning and 
response skills to respond to public health emergencies were largely lost over time.  The 
need to coordinate and integrate with other agencies remained minimal until the late 
1990s. 
In many ways, public health agencies effectively worked themselves out of their 
emergency roles and requisite funding by being successful in mitigating many disease 
threats.7   Public health infrastructure suffered continuing budget cuts, resulting in 
agencies that were struggling to maintain existing programs.  Public health agencies were 
already handicapped — by deteriorating infrastructure and diminishing budget support — 
when they received their new directives to meet Homeland Security objectives.   
To ensure maximum capability to plan for and respond appropriately to 
emergency incidents, public health agencies must be able to effectively collaborate with 
other agencies involved in Homeland Security preparedness and response activities.  For 
example, any mass vaccination event will require the combined resources of public 
health, fire, law enforcement, and emergency management agencies.  Effective and safe 
dispensing sites can only be managed with the assistance of multiple agencies.  Without 
the other responder agencies, Public Health will fail in its obligations to provide 
preventative medications or vaccines to the public in emergency incidents. 
Public Health capability for appropriate response is vital, not only in addressing 
natural and intentional biological incidents, but in addressing other disaster and 
emergency incidents that affect the public’s health.  Successful collaborative efforts will 
assist public health agencies in all emergency planning and response goals by improving 
interagency coordination through established, positive interagency relationships and 
improved planning and response capabilities.    
Public health agencies are diverse organizations administrating multiple health 
programs already in place.  Interagency collaboration to improve communication and 
                                                 
 
7 NGA Center for Best Practices, Issue Brief, Contact:  Jeff Mitchell, State Strategies for Fully 
Integrating Public Health into Homeland Security, November 23, 2005. 
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coordination is considered vital to improving Public Health response.8  Because the 
greatest amount of interaction with other agencies must occur at the local level, where 
other local responders — such as fire, police and hospitals — are involved, an 
appropriate amount of funding must be directed locally if local capabilities are to be 
adequate.  Local public health agencies bear the immediate burden of disease surveillance 
and outbreak response, public and agency emergency training and education, public 
health risk communications, health advisory dissemination, and planning for public 
health emergencies such as pandemic influenza.  Although federal and state public health 
agencies provide support for these activities, the groundwork for preparedness, planning, 
communications, coordination, response, and integration occurs at the local level.  
Nationally, federal funding passed though state health agencies provide significant 
funding for local health agencies, accounting for 30 percent of local funding.9     
Funding structures and procedures directly affect the preparedness and response 
capabilities of local public health agencies.  In Arizona, the state health agency currently 
passes through only 50 percent of Public Health Emergency Preparedness funds to county 
public health agencies.  This hampers local Public Health efforts to develop and maintain 
the large number of program activities that are required to meet their grant deliverables;  
the number of staff available to accomplish the required deliverables is severely curtailed.  
In fact, Cooperative Agreement funding for Arizona counties has remained level since 
the inception of this grant’s funding, despite an increasing number of deliverable tasks 
and increasing employee-related costs.10   
The Department of Health and Human Services has argued that some jurisdictions 
have not been able to expend funds they were allotted.  Subsequently, those funds were 
redirected to support other initiatives.  The problem of unexpended funds affects local 
jurisdictions as well.  A United States Government Accountability Office report found 
                                                 
 
8 Eileen Salinsky, Senior Research Associate, “Will the Nation be Ready for the Next Bioterrorism 
Attack?  Mending Gaps in the Public Health Infrastructure,” National Health Policy Forum, The George 
Washington University, Washington, D.C., NHPF Issue Brief, No. 776, June 12, 2002. 
9 Salinsky, “Public Health Emergency Preparedness:  Fundamentals of the System.”  
10 Tom Schryer, Director of Public Health, Pinal County Division of Public Health, Pinal County, 
Arizona. Personal communication, September 2005. 
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that factors including administrative practices — such as hiring freezes, contracting and 
procurement processes, the need for information technology upgrade, and the inability to 
hire qualified staff — resulted in difficulties in expending and obligating funds.11  These 
same factors that have hampered state jurisdictions’ spending also hold true at the local 
level.  With the initiation of these funds, local public health departments suddenly found 
themselves competing for qualified employees to develop Public Health emergency 
preparedness programs.  Without adequate staffing, programs cannot be developed or 
expanded to meet various objectives.  Now that Public Health emergency preparedness 
programs have been established, local public health agencies have learned more about 
what is needed to build and maintain emergency capacity but now may find themselves 
short of funds and staffing to complete those activities.   
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Cooperative Agreement 
Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness for 2005–2006 describes nine goals 
outlined below:12 
Prevent:  
(1) Increase the use and development of interventions known to prevent human 
illness from chemical, biological, radiological agents, and naturally occurring 
health threats. 
(2) Decrease the time needed to classify health events as terrorism or naturally 
occurring in partnership with other agencies. 
 
Detect/ Report: 
(3) Decrease the time needed to detect and report chemical, biological, 
radiological agents in tissue, food or environmental samples that  
cause threats to the public’s health. 
(4) Improve the timeliness and accuracy of information regarding threats to the 
public’s health as reported by clinicians and through electronic early event 
detection, in real time, to those who need to know. 
 
 
                                                 
 
11 United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, 
Bioterrorism, Information on Jurisdictions’ Expenditure and Reported Obligation of Program Funds, 
February 2005. 
12 Cooperative Agreement Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, July 1, 2005. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/guidance05/index.asp,  accessed 
March 20, 2007. ….. 
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Investigate:  
(5) Decrease the time to identify causes, risk factors, and appropriate 
interventions for those affected by threats to the public’s health. 
 
Control:  
(6) Decrease the time needed to provide countermeasures and health guidance to 
those affected by threats to the public’s health. 
 
Recover:  
(7) Decrease the time needed to restore health services and environmental safety 
to pre-event levels. 




(9) Decrease the time needed to implement recommendations from  
after action reports following threats to the public’s health. 
 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention outlines further activities 
required for states to receive federal funding. They include the establishment or 
participation in a senior advisory committee to coordinate funding; integration with other 
funded programs; coordination with military bases, tribes, and local health agencies; and 
National Incident Management System compliance.  An additional requirement, which 
requires the greatest support and implementation at the local level, is the evaluated ability 
to respond to events, which will be measured by assessments, drills, exercises, site visits 
and responses to real incidents. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in providing general activities 
guidance, has left each state to interpret this guidance.  Some goals, such as building 
laboratory capacity and developing statewide electronic reporting systems, must be 
accomplished at the state level.  Some goals require both state and local Public Health 
efforts to be successful.  Most of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s goals 
for state public health departments must be accomplished at the local levels.  For this 
reason, financial support for local Public Health infrastructure is critical to the success of 
federal objectives.  Because emergency incidents occur sporadically, local infrastructure 
must be consistently funded for local Public Health to maintain the capacities to respond 
to actual emergency incidents and to maintain the personnel and skills needed to do this.  
 10 
Besides the detailed guidance given to local public health agencies from the state 
and federal levels, Public Health preparedness and response activities are determined in 
part by public expectations.  In an emergency, local Public Health is expected to provide 
needed health services.  The public is often unaware that public health agencies do not 
have adequate resources to fulfill that function.  Additionally, most Public Health 
healthcare staffs, especially those in rural areas, are not trained to respond to emergencies 
or provide intensive patient care. Nor do they have adequate resources to train staff that 
are not directly funded by Cooperative Agreement funding.  Even if funding is found for 
limited staff training, public health staff not funded by Cooperative Agreement dollars 
are often funded by other grant dollars, and must abide by those grant funding 
parameters, making it impossible to take more than a handful of hours away from their 
prescribed activities.   
In short, local Public Health agencies were once better able to respond effectively 
to acute public health threats and were considered front-line responders.  Their 
effectiveness in eliminating immediate health threats resulted in decreased funding over 
time, resulting in lost capacity and ability to respond.  Funding structures that supported 
maintenance of routine public health activities evolved without allowing the building of 
capacities to respond to acute health threats.  Over time, the importance and participation 
of local public health in responder activities was reduced, isolating public health from 
partnerships with other first-responder agencies.   
Current funding systems for public health programs — other than emergency 
preparedness — do not allow for overall public health emergency preparedness and 
response capacity.  Current funding for emergency preparedness continues to be reduced, 
cutting short capacity building at a critical time when limited progress is just being made.  
If public health agencies are to be effective Homeland Security partners, they must be 
funded and included fully in activities supporting national objectives.  Likewise, public 
health agencies must take the initiative to show progress in fulfilling their objectives and 
commitment to emergency preparedness and response capacity building. 
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B. PRESCRIBED PUBLIC HEALTH ROLES 
1. Prevention 
Local public health agencies have several tasks written into the Public Health 
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement as interpreted by individual states.  The foundation 
for prevention is planning, and the groundwork for planning is accomplished at the local 
level.  In Arizona, local public health agencies are expected to develop written local plans 
for communication and information dissemination, 24/7 notification, exercises, Public 
Health emergency response, smallpox and mass vaccination, Strategic National Stockpile 
utilization, and pandemic influenza.13  Every plan must take an all-hazards approach and 
be National Incident Management System compliant.  Although there are general plans 
for each of these at the state level, the detailed, jurisdiction-specific implementation of 
any of these plans must occur at the local level.  Plans require coordination and 
collaboration with multiple stakeholders such as local hospitals, fire, behavioral health, 
law enforcement, tribal, and emergency management agencies.  Without collaboration 
with all involved agencies at the local level, plans cannot be successfully implemented.  
All partners must know and agree to their roles in public health emergencies.  Developing 
and maintaining relationships with all these partners is a time-consuming but necessary 
activity for planning success.     
In many cases, mutual aid agreements must be written and passed through 
agencies’ legal approval processes — which can take many months — in order for plans 
to be fully and realistically implemented.  Particularly difficult to develop are mutual aid 
agreements with tribal entities. This is due to the sovereign nature of tribal governments 
and the need for the language in those agreements to correctly reflect individual tribal 
sovereignty and governmental structure while remaining acceptable to all involved 
parties.  Again, a great deal of time is required on the part of local public health agencies 
and tribes to mutually develop relationships based on trust and respect. 
                                                 
 
13 Arizona Department of Health Services, County Deliverables, Cooperative Agreement Guidance 
for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, 2005/2006 grant year.  
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Local Arizona public health agencies are also expected to coordinate emergency 
activities with federal, state, and private correctional facilities, behavioral agencies, 
regional hospital groups, medical providers, and volunteer organizations.  They are 
required to track local food and water companies that conduct emergency response 
planning or vulnerability assessments and be prepared to respond to small-scale 
suspected food tampering and agro-terrorism incidents.  Border counties must also 
participate in cross-border activities with Mexico; all Arizona counties contend with a 
constant flow of undocumented aliens through their areas, adding to their public health 
responsibilities.  Counties may also pre-position antiviral or antibiotic medications for 
public health staff, volunteers, and their families and purchase personal protective 
equipment for public health first responders. Due to the limitations placed on these 
resources by federal funding criteria, however, they may not make them available to 
other responder agencies. 
Local public health agencies are the coordinating and collaborative foundation for 
Public Health preparedness.  Undertaking this task is huge, especially when public health 
agencies have not had to closely collaborate with responder agencies for many decades 
and are already limited by an eroded funding infrastructure. 
2. Education 
Many public health personnel, especially those not directly involved in 
preparedness activities, do not have the basic knowledge needed to respond to emergency 
events.  Although they have been active in many other aspects of Public Health, 
emergency response differs significantly from day-to-day public health activities such as 
maternal and child health care or family planning education.   
One primary educational responsibility best accomplished with state and local 
health agency collaboration is the development of a core curriculum for Public Health 
preparedness to provide training continuity at local levels.  This objective is not directly 
tasked or measured in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention cooperative 
agreement; this allows states to determine their own course in this area.  Local public 
health agencies need to be involved with this, as only they can determine the level of 
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expertise needed by their agencies.  Aside from federal requirements that public health 
agencies be National Incident Management System compliant, there remains no standard 
core curriculum to ensure a minimum base knowledge across the public health 
community.   
In Arizona, local health agencies are tasked with preparing their own emergency 
preparedness training plans for public health staff and volunteers. They include personal 
and family preparedness, emergency response overview, and behavioral health issues in 
disasters.  They are also tasked with providing localized emergency preparedness 
trainings for rapid response teams, including hazardous materials and personal protective 
equipment, mass vaccination clinics, business continuity, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency cost recovery, and risk communication.  In addition, local Arizona 
public health agencies are also responsible for training volunteers performing public 
health tasks in mass vaccination clinics and other public health emergency duties, and for 
providing training to physicians and health care professionals. 
3. Early Warning Infectious Disease Surveillance Project 
Local Arizona public health agencies that border Mexico must also participate in 
Early Warning Infectious Disease Surveillance program activities, which focus on early 
detection, identification, and reporting of infectious diseases associated with public health 
threats, including potential bioterrorism agents.14  This includes participating in meetings, 
subcommittees, and border-wide training programs related to infectious disease 
surveillance and response.  They must also conduct exercises that involve local hospitals 
and laboratories, community health care institutions, emergency response agencies, and 
public safety agencies, and they must develop the capacity to undertake joint 
epidemiological investigations.   
 
 
                                                 
 
14  “United States–Mexico Border Health Commission — Early Warning Infectious Disease 
Surveillance Project.” http://www.borderhealth.org/ewids.php?curr=programs, Accessed January 10, 2006.  
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4.  Disease Surveillance 
Disease detection, diagnosis, and response are vital components of disease 
surveillance and control for potential bioterrorism agents.  Local public health agencies 
are typically the first governmental agencies to detect disease outbreaks and are required 
to be able to triage urgent disease reports at all times.  In Arizona, they are also expected 
to investigate outbreaks and issue disease control recommendations for all types of 
communicable disease outbreaks, including food-borne outbreaks, and to investigate 
syndromic alerts issued by BioSense.  BioSense is a part of a national biosurveillance 
initiative by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to assist states and localities 
in analyzing disease reporting data from multiple sources.15  Often, local public health 
resources are inadequate to keep up with expectations and must set response priorities 
based on known existing Public Health threats — versus suspected threats.   
Public health disease surveillance systems, mainly passive systems relying on 
laboratory and physician reporting, have been in use for many decades. They detect 
various disease patterns caused by bacteria, viruses, and environmental hazards that 
increase morbidity and mortality among human and non-human populations.  This 
existing capacity to look for patterns is one of the greatest strengths of the Public Health 
system.  Public health epidemiologists are familiar with recognizing various disease 
patterns and implementing disease control practices across populations.  
However, infectious disease cases remain largely underreported by physicians 
who may have little time or incentive to report.  The Arizona Department of Health 
Services estimates that reporting sources report only about 10 percent of reportable 
disease cases as required by law.16    Laboratories are typically better reporters, but only 
report positive test results, not disease cases.  For example, a laboratory may report 
multiple positive results for a single patient, while a physician will report a positive 
disease case in an individual.  Even so, reported disease cases must be reviewed 
                                                 
 
15 Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, “The BioSense Initiative,” Issue Brief, 
October 2004. 
16 From 1994 through 2001, the author was employed as an Infectious Disease Epidemiologist at 
ADHS, and worked extensively with disease reporting, surveillance and investigation activities. 
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carefully, to ensure that a disease case exists.  Not all positive laboratory results or 
physician diagnoses actually indicate a disease case.  For this reason, local public health 
epidemiologists must closely interpret the data to ensure an accurate assessment of 
disease occurrence and appropriate control measures. 
Most current infectious disease surveillance is primarily passive.  Passive disease 
surveillance relies on health care providers and laboratories reporting selected diseases to 
public health entities and is noted for the extended lag times between disease diagnoses 
and disease reporting, thereby slowing the recognition of disease outbreaks.17  This lag 
time is exacerbated by patients delaying or not seeking health care for illnesses.  
Electronic reporting, active surveillance (i.e., actively acquiring disease incidence data), 
and increased reporting compliance is helpful in overcoming these limitations, but often 
requires more resources than local public health agencies have available.  To be effective 
in meeting Homeland Security objectives, disease reporting must be improved.   
Public Health disease surveillance and control differs entirely from clinical patient 
management.  Public Health disease surveillance looks for patterns and trends among 
populations and considers the treatment and control of diseases in individual patients as a 
means of controlling diseases in populations.  This is not to say that Public Health is 
uncaring of individuals, it simply recognizes that controlling diseases in populations is 
contingent on individual patients receiving appropriate treatment.   
It also differs from bio-agent detection surveillance systems that detect specific 
bio-agents in the environment as a means for identifying possible risk of disease.18  
Overall risk of acquiring disease is another matter completely from identifying actual 
disease cases and controlling them appropriately. While both clinical treatment and bio-
agent detection systems contribute to the overall picture of diseases in populations, 
                                                 
 
17  United States General Accounting Office.  Infectious Diseases, Gaps Remain in Surveillance 
Capabilities of State and Local Agencies.  Testimony before the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Preparedness and Response, Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, by Janet 
Heinrich, Director, Health Care – Public Health Issues.  September 24, 2003.  
18 Dena M. Bravata, Vandana Sunderam, Kathryn M. McDonald, Wendy M. Smith,  Herbert Szeto, 
Mark D. Schleinitz, and Douglas K. Wens,  Evaluating Detection and Diagnostic Decision Support 
Systems for Bioterrorism Response.  Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 10, No. 1, January 2004. 
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neither can substitute for Public Health disease surveillance systems.  Clinical medical 
systems are typically unable to view specific disease incidence with sufficient scope to 
detect pattern anomalies throughout populations and are not designed for that purpose.  
Bio-agent detection systems may lack sufficient specificity or sensitivity to detect agents 
and are not direct indicators of actual disease exposures and infection; they are merely 
indicators of the possibility of disease exposure. 
Since September 11, 2001, the need for improvement to Public Health’s ability to 
detect and respond to intentional disease outbreaks has been identified as a Homeland 
Security objective.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security notes that “information 
contributes to every aspect of homeland security and is a vital foundation for the 
homeland security effort”. 19   
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s list of bio-agents includes 
forty-one disease organisms or syndromes.20    On the other hand, the list of nationally 
reportable diseases includes fifty-eight disease organisms or syndromes.21  State laws 
often include additional disease organisms or syndromes that are of interest regionally. 
In the future, Public Health objectives will include enhancing passive disease 
surveillance systems, implementing active disease surveillance systems, developing 
redundant reporting systems, upgrading and standardizing nationally reportable data, and 
decreasing reporting lag times through electronic reporting.  The National Electronic 
Disease Surveillance System developed by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention provides a uniform data architecture for disease reporting as well as a 
structure for consistent data maintenance, which will result in reduced costs, greater 
efficiency, and increased data quality.22  However, implementing these improvements 
                                                 
 
19 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, 55. July 2002.  
20 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,  “Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases,” 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp, accessed September 10, 2004.  
21 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,  Nationally Notifiable Diseases, United States 2004, 
http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/phs/infdis2004.htm, accessed September 10, 2004. 
22 United States General Accounting Office.  Post-hearing Question from the May 8, 2003, Hearing on 
Barriers to Information Sharing at the Department of Homeland Security.  Response to the Committee on 
Government Reform of the U.S. Congress House of Representatives.  July 7, 2003.  
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requires great resources at both the state and local level.  The management and 
standardization of health data presents many more challenges than most realize. 
5. Communications and Information Dissemination 
One new area for public health agencies is the use of communications equipment 
that other responder agencies have used for many years, such as handheld radios and 
satellite telephones.  It falls to each local public health agency to coordinate with 
responder agencies the type of communications equipment needed and to teach all public 
health personnel to use it properly.  In addition, public health agencies must test and 
exercise the use of equipment. 
Public health agencies are responsible for disseminating health advisory 
information to various groups, such as medical providers, schools, veterinarians, and fire 
and law enforcement agencies.  This is accomplished in part through the Health Alert 
Network.  As health advisory information is received from federal or state public health 
departments, it is channeled down to the local level and disseminated to recipients 
through email or facsimile.  The identification of gaps in communications dissemination 
is also the responsibility of local public health agencies in Arizona. 
Public health agencies are also expected to provide emergency public information 
to partner agencies, the media, the general public, and hard to reach populations.  While 
standardized message information is available from the federal and state levels, it must be 
adapted and maintained at the local level.  In Arizona, it falls to the local public health 
agencies to develop relationships with hard-to-reach populations, such as non-English 
speaking persons, migrant workers, people with disabilities including mental illness, 
people with homebound or medical conditions, the geographically isolated, and those 
persons without a usual means of communication such as telephones, televisions, or 
radios.  The local public health agencies are also required to be able to provide a hotline 





Developing and participating in exercises is another area of expertise fairly new to 
the public health community.  Local Arizona public health agencies are expected to plan, 
implement, identify deficiencies, and apply corrective actions to regional and local 
exercises. These include tribes, emergency management, hospitals, schools, and other 
agencies as appropriate.  While the state may provide some technical support, the vast 
majority of the work falls to the local public health agency.  In addition, the local public 
health agencies are expected to participate in other state or regional exercises as they 
occur. 
C. ADDITIONAL ROLES 
Public expectations often drive the activities of government entities.  In an 
emergency, public health agencies are implicitly expected to provide support in 
addressing any emergency issues involving the health and medical welfare of the public.  
For example, in Arizona, the American Red Cross is unable to provide shelter services 
for people requiring special assistance.  This leaves it to local public health agencies to 
plan for and provide services for those segments of the population.  It does not matter 
whether local public health agencies have the personnel or funding to provide those 
services.  In an emergency, the public expects that shelter services for those needing 
special assistance will be available.  
In Arizona, local public health agencies’ preparedness staffs are also expected to 
participate in planning and readiness activities for pandemic influenza, including 
influenza surveillance, and receive a limited amount of funding to do so.  This results in a 
large, additional local Public Health burden. It requires many hours of planning and 
exercising with multiple agencies — and the development of extensive public education 





The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Public Health Preparedness 
Cooperative Agreement’s grant guidance defines several public health readiness goals for 
states.  The states in turn interpret these goals for local public health agencies and pass 
through a portion of these monies to local public health agencies.  However, the majority 
of the work to accomplish these goals is done at the local level, with a few exceptions, 
such as developing statewide electronic reporting and information dissemination systems.  
Most isolation and quarantine processes occur at the local level, where they should, due 
to the need for quick action to control specific disease transmission.  The Cities 
Readiness Initiative is another program developed and implemented largely at the local 
level for cities included in those programs.  Arizona local public health agencies also are 
primarily responsible for the recruitment, training and coordination of Public Health 
volunteers.  Because of the variety of volunteer systems in existence, local public health 
agencies often provide support and collaborate with multiple local volunteer agencies.  
Because of the large number of activities and responsibilities that must occur at the local 
level, local public health agencies must be adequately funded or they will be unable to 
develop the capacities needed to reach federal objectives. 
However, even with positive changes in funding structures, Public Health must 
commit to making organizational changes to expand its scope of capabilities in order to 
become an effective response discipline.  Other responder disciplines have transformed 
themselves in response to changing demands.  Public Health is capable of meeting its 
expanded responsibilities as well.   
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III. TRANSFORMATIONAL MODELS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Even with changes in funding structures, acceptance and inclusion by Homeland 
Security partners, and training and education initiatives, public health agencies cannot 
fundamentally transform themselves into effective partners without transforming their 
agencies and expanding their scope of public service.  Organizational transformation is 
not merely exchanging one set of tasks for another, while still operating in basically the 
same manner with the same basic mission.  It is making fundamental, sometimes radical, 
changes in the way and the reason an organization operates.23  For example, even though 
public health agencies gradually changed from conducting sanitation and disease 
eradication efforts to addressing more chronic health issues in the last century, it 
continued to operate in basically the same way.  The existing public health culture has 
continued to be perpetuated.   
Other agencies, among them fire and law enforcement, have undergone 
transformational shifts that have allowed them to make not only changes in what they do 
as an agency, but in how they relate to the communities in which they operate.  Fire 
agencies have been very adaptable to new tasks, allowing them to fill a large number of 
public safety and health niches.  Law enforcement agencies have initiated fewer new 
organizational roles, but have made great progress in filling new roles that allow them to 
deliberately change the way they relate to communities.  Public health agencies can 
model these types of transformational changes, not only to improve the way they relate to 
the public, but to effect changes in how they relate to other responder agencies.  
However, the only way these transformational changes can occur is if they are made 
deliberately by all levels of leadership, from the top down.  Even with leadership support, 
ingrained cultural behaviors will take time to change, due to the natural tendency of 
people to resist changes in their environments. 
                                                 
 
23Carter McNamara, PhD, “Basic Context for Organizational Change,” 
http://www.managementhelp.org/mgmnt/orgchnge.htm, accessed January 11, 2006. 
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B. FIRE AGENCIES 
Fire agencies are a good example of successful organizational transformations.  
The number of fires, injuries, and deaths has continually been reduced since 197424 due 
to factors such as better building codes, equipment, and notification systems. As fire 
suppression activities have been reduced, fire agencies have been subject to continuing 
budget cuts, similar to the history of budget cuts within public health systems.  These 
budget cuts strain many fire districts, with some communities opting for volunteer fire 
services rather than using career fire personnel. 
As fire suppression activities have been reduced, many fire departments have 
initiated programs relating to fire prevention.  Some of these programs include building 
plans and review, free distribution of home smoke alarms, juvenile fire-setting 
prevention, school fire safety, and fire code inspections.25  By expanding their range of 
community services, fire agencies have been able to remain useful community resources.  
However, these types of services have not really required fundamental transformation 
within these agencies, instead being more of a logical extension to fire suppression 
services. 
In conjunction with their proximity to and relationships with their communities, 
some fire agencies offer services traditionally offered by public health agencies, such as 
immunizations, blood pressure checks, and car seat checks.  Some fire departments allow 
their buildings to be used as voting sites during elections.  All of these activities serve to 
tie the fire service closer to the communities in which they serve, making them trusted 
community partners.  In contrast, public health agencies tend to have limited services, 
defined by grant deliverables.  They also tend to have fewer physical sites and fewer 
observed business hours.  This makes public health agencies less accessible and useful to 
the communities they serve. 
                                                 
 
24 “Fire in the United States:  Executive Summary,” 13th Edition, National Fire Data Center, United 
States Fire Administration, January 11, 2005.  1992-2001.  
25 “A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service,” A Cooperative Study Authorized by U.S. Public 
Law 106-398, Federal Emergency Management Association, U.S. Fire Administration, and the National 
Fire Prevention Association International.  FA-240, December 2002. 
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Fire services also provide many other services unrelated to fire suppression, such 
as medical aid and emergency medical services, hazardous materials and emergency 
medical services response to suspected chemical or biological agents, and limited 
technical rescues with emergency medical services.26  With these additional skills, 
firefighters are even more suited to respond to terrorism incidents.  
It is no surprise that fire agencies are considered the first responders in any 
emergency incident.27  Fire agencies have continually transformed themselves to meet 
the needs of their communities and jurisdictions, and in doing so have made themselves 
invaluable partners in Homeland Security.   
Public health agencies can benefit from many of the characteristics developed by 
fire agencies.  First, public health agencies need to develop the flexibility to expand and 
change the services they offer in response to changing demands.  Because public health 
services are often dictated by grant deliverables, it may be necessary to develop 
additional funding flexibility by relying on more than just grant funding.  For example, 
many fire agencies are funded through tax dollars in districts or municipalities.  Having 
additional or alternate sources of funding such as this may allow public health agencies 
the flexibility they need to adapt to changing needs.   
Public health may also expand their accessibility and perceived value to the 
communities they serve by expanding their scope of services and increasing their 
visibility to the public.  Although public health agencies will likely never have the 
number of “brick and mortar” sites as fire service, increased visibility in the community 
through expanded business hours and services will be helpful in establishing their 
presence as community partners.  Finally, by committing to participate fully as partners 
in emergency preparedness and response activities, public health agencies can establish 
their value as Homeland Security partners.  
 
                                                 
 
26 “A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service,” 106-398. 
27 Terrorism Questions and Answers, Council on Foreign Relations, February 11, 2005, 
http//cfrterrorism.org/security/fire.html, accessed January 15, 2006. 
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C. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES  
In contrast to fire agencies, law enforcement agencies have initiated fewer 
individual programs outside of their usual activities such as intelligence, crime control, 
and maintaining public security.  However, in those areas where they have expanded their 
functions, they have made strategic plans and structured efforts to collaborate with their 
communities and outside partners, reducing the isolative culture that has developed in 
law enforcement.   
The subculture of isolation in law enforcement agencies has been well-studied, 
along with the factors leading to that isolation from the general public community; these 
include paramilitary-like training, discipline, and dress standards.28  This traditional 
subculture reduces positive community interactions and decreases the cooperation and 
trust of law enforcement by citizens when citizens perceive law enforcement officers as 
outside regulatory authorities who are uninterested or uncaring of community concerns 
and interests.  By transforming themselves into community resources rather than 
community regulators, and by increasing their partnerships with the public and other 
agencies, law enforcement agencies will establish themselves as even more valuable 
Homeland Security partners. 
The primary philosophical change responsible for transformation in law 
enforcement is the concept of community policing.  Community policing broadens the 
nature of police functions and makes better use of the resources that may be available to 
law enforcement agencies.  It emphasizes organizational change, flattening of the vertical 
hierarchical structure, decentralization of decision making, and working with citizens and 
external partners in solving problems.29  Community policing programs encourage 
community communication.   Law enforcement officers may be assigned as school 
                                                 
 
28 Stephen J. Harrison, “Police Organizational Culture: Using Ingrained Values To Build Positive 
Organizational Improvement.”  Pennsylvania State University, 1998. http://www.pamij.com/harrison.html, 
accessed March 17, 2007.  
29 Matthew C. Scheider and Robert Chapman, “Community Policing and Terrorism,” April 2003, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Scheider-Chapman.html, accessed February 11, 2005. 
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resource officers where they can teach classes in crime prevention and drug abuse.30 
Officers may be assigned to patrol and take responsibility for defined geographical areas, 
encouraged to have positive preventative interactions with the public, and be required to 
work with their community partners to identify potential threats and solve problems.   
Community policing has been supported by the United States Department of 
Justice and encouraged through programmatic funding through the Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services.31  It serves as an example of organizational transformation 
strategically and financially, supported from the top levels of leadership and implemented 
throughout all levels of law enforcement.   
D.   SUMMARY 
Public health agencies can utilize transformational strategies already used by fire 
and law enforcement agencies.  Fire agencies continue to learn and implement new 
services that tie them more closely to their communities.  These services offset much of 
the reduction in fire suppression activities that has occurred over time.  Many of the 
services they offer are those traditionally offered by public health agencies, such as 
immunizations, car seat checks, and blood pressure checks.  In addition, fire agencies 
participate in hazardous materials teams and respond to suspected terrorism incidents 
such as suspicious powdery substance exposures.  By adding diversified programs to fire 
agencies, those agencies have made themselves more visible to the communities they 
serve and are perceived as valuable Homeland Security partners.  As part of 
transformational change, Public Health leadership at all levels should support the addition 
of non-traditional public health tasks, such as emergency preparedness, and develop 
educational and training initiatives that will assist personnel to develop new skills that 
will assist public health in reaching Homeland Security objectives.  In order to 
                                                 
 
30 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, “COPS Fact Sheet, 
Cops in Schools,” The COPS Commitment to School Safety, www.cops.usdoj.gov, updated March 10, 
2004, accessed 2/11/2005.  . 
31 Ibid. 
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accomplish this, federal funding guidelines for all types of Public Health must allow the 
flexibility needed to train and support all staff to respond to emergency incidents. 
The importance of leadership driving transformational processes is critical to 
public health success in transforming itself into a broader spectrum of functions.  Key 
practices identified in a United States General Accounting Office forum on lessons 
learned for a Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies on mergers 
and transformation include the following key practices: 32 
• Ensure top leadership drives the transformation. 
• Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the 
transformation. 
• Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the 
transformation. 
• Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show 
progress from day one. 
• Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process. 
• Use the performance management system to define responsibility and 
assure accountability for change. 
• Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and 
report related progress. 
• Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the 
transformation. 
• Build a world-class organization.  
The law enforcement model of community policing closely follows these key 
practices by supportively structuring their transformational activities throughout multiple 
law enforcement agencies through the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services cooperative grants.  These programs offer both funding and 
guidance in reaching key community policing goals.    
Federal Public health leadership can promote faster transformational success 
structuring competitive funding to promote transformational goals at the local and state 
levels.  At the same time, clear guidance on reaching these goals must be developed at the 
federal level to ensure more consistent results locally. 
                                                 
 
32 United States General Accounting Office, Comptroller General of the United States, November 
2002, Highlights of a GAO Forum, “Mergers and Transformation:  Lessons Learned for a Department of 
Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies.” 
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IV. AGENCY BARRIERS TO PUBLIC HEALTH INTEGRATION 
A. BACKGROUND  
Public Health faces many barriers to needed integration with emergency 
management and other responder agencies.33  Especially difficult to overcome are 
priority barriers, because local or state public health leaders may not agree that Homeland 
Security objectives are a priority for public health agencies.  Public health cultural 
barriers pose continuing obstacles in almost every interagency interaction, as they are 
long ingrained into the workings and interactions of public health agencies.   
Responder agencies, including fire, law, and emergency management agencies, 
are frequently unsure of the role and functions of Public Health.  In many emergency 
management planning and exercise activities, public health agencies often find 
themselves only peripherally participating or lumped together with health institutions that 
provide acute clinical care.  Some responders are unwilling to work with Public Health 
due to a history of poor interactions, which continue to be perpetuated due to differences 
in communication and decision making styles. 
B. PUBLIC HEALTH CULTURE  
1.   Priorities 
One major underlying problem with public health integration into the Homeland 
Security interagency community is that local public health agencies have varying ability 
and willingness to consistently focus appropriate funding and other resources on 
activities and priorities in Homeland Security-related programs.  With so many other 
under-funded programs, reduced budgets, and crumbling infrastructure in relation to 
other public health needs that require attention (such as poor prenatal health, teen 
pregnancy, and sexually transmitted diseases) it is not difficult to understand why some 
Public Health officials may consider Homeland Security objectives a competing or lower 
                                                 
 
33 NGA Center for Best Practices, Issue Brief,  State Strategies for Fully Integrating Public Health into 
Homeland Security, November 23, 2005.  
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priority.  After all, why should so much money go towards preparing for events that may 
never happen when there are current health problems to address daily?  
An example of this occurred at an Arizona Department of Health Services-
sponsored Crisis Communication Training Workshop,34 where one health department 
director repeatedly focused on “slow-moving disasters” such as tobacco use and obesity.  
This discordance in focus between Public Health and Homeland Security objectives, 
illustrated by the speaker’s spontaneous redefinition of chronic conditions as disasters, is 
not atypical in public health agencies.   
Certainly tobacco use and obesity are important chronic health threats, but 
Homeland Security objectives and funding should not be put aside in favor of other 
public health agendas and priorities.  Cohen et al., in an editorial on the home webpage of 
the American Public Health Association state: 
But other bioterrorist initiatives are more questionable. Before they are 
implemented by the public health community, such programs must be 
thoughtfully and scientifically examined in terms of their necessity, 
efficacy, safety, and cost.  Bioterrorist initiatives may divert resources 
from other, more urgently needed public health tasks or may place public 
health agencies and personnel under the control of military or law 
enforcement officials. We should pause to consider how to maximize the 
limited resources available for the health protection of the people of the 
United States and of the world…. The U.S. government’s active support 
for bioterrorist initiative programs stands in marked contrast to the 
inadequate attention that has been paid to providing more basic resources 
necessary to protect the U.S. and the global population from prevalent 
infectious diseases and the chemical threats posed by environmental 
pollution. While one instance of intentional salmonella contamination may 
be persuasive to advocates of bioterrorist initiatives, perhaps public health 
would be better served by preventing the millions of illnesses and 
thousands of deaths from food-borne infections that occur annually 
because of negligence and inadequate inspections. More broadly, finding 
ways to provide adequate food, housing, and health care for all would 
increase levels of resistance to infection while diminishing the causes of 
terrorism and war.35 
                                                 
 
34 ADHS Crisis Communication Workshop, May 4-5, 2004, Phoenix, AZ. 
35 Hillel W. Cohen, Robert M. Gould, Victor W. Sidel, American Public Health Association Journal 
website, http://www.apha.org/journal/editorials/editcoh.htm, accessed May 31, 2004.  
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While it is true that health problems abound worldwide, and there is certainly 
insufficient funding to build even basic Public Health infrastructure, this pervasive 
position on the part of Public Health unnecessarily places world health in competition 
with accomplishing Homeland Security objectives.  It also assumes that war and 
terrorism are the sole results of poor health, nutrition, and housing, while ignoring other 
possible causes such as religious extremism and economic control.   Public Health 
preparedness and response capacity is a priority because emergency incidents happen, 
whether intentionally or as natural events.  Regardless of their readiness to handle such 
events, public health agencies, especially those at the local level, are responsible for a 
number of response activities. Until Public Health leadership recognizes that emergency 
incident preparedness is an integral part of Public Health infrastructure, rather than a 
competing priority, it is unlikely that this situation will change.   
Funding priorities present other problems in managing public health personnel.  
Since local public health agencies are largely grant-funded,36 pulling staff from one 
grant-funded activity to another funding stream’s activities may adversely affect the 
performance measures of the first grant activity and future funding for those areas.  
Unless public health agencies are given the authority to address emergency events 
without negative consequences from other grant-funded programs, there will always be 
difficulties in assigning non-emergency public health personnel to preparedness 
activities.  In a true emergency, this would not likely pose a barrier until afterward, when 
grant accountability became questioned.  However, the time required to train public 
health staffs continues to be a problem as there are few funds available to pay for this, 
and other public health programs cannot allow staffs to participate except in only 
minimal ways.  
Last, public health agencies have not always had a requirement to be available 
during non-business hours.  Even now, due to Cooperative Agreement requirements, only 
a limited number of employees are available.  Because of a history of only working 
during common business hours, most public health employees are unaccustomed to being 
                                                 
 
36 Tom Schryer, Director of Public Health, reports that the Pinal County Division of Public Health, in 
the third largest county in Arizona, is approximately 80% grant-funded. 
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available to work evenings and weekends.  Many consider this type of request 
unreasonable, rather than a part of their normal job expectations.   
2.   Communications and Decision Making 
Public health agencies have evolved a different communication style from other 
responder agencies.  Public health communication styles tend to be indirect, laced with 
qualifying criteria, and may be perceived as circuitous and difficult to understand.  There 
is a general absence of absolute statements.  For example, if a public health official were 
describing a fire, he or she might say that there appears to be a fire, but it may be a 
prescribed fire and it only appears to be affecting a very specific part of the building; but 
there are insufficient data to support this conclusion.  For agencies trying to get a direct 
answer, this may be frustrating and results in qualified public health personnel perceived 
as unconvincing.  Is there a fire or not?  Do they even know?  Of course they do; they are 
just unable to communicate it effectively.  The complex nature of disease transmission 
and the multitude of complicated disease etiologies make it almost impossible for a 
public health professional to answer disease-related questions simply and directly.  There 
is always an exception to the rule.   
In the fire example above, the answer of course is, “There is a fire.”  Health issues 
are rarely that simple.  Many public health personnel may be uncomfortable making 
definitive statements about anything unless the listener understands all the parameters 
used to develop those statements and the criteria that would make those statements 
invalid.  This can be a very difficult communication style for other agencies to work with.  
Law enforcement personnel often report that this appears to be “doubletalk” and that this 
style of communication makes public health people sound indecisive and less than 
credible.37   
Public health personnel are often unfamiliar with the language and acronyms of 
other agencies, and other agencies are unfamiliar with Public Health’s numerous 
acronyms for not only public health terms but medical terms as well.  In effect, Public 
                                                 
 
37 Multiple personal conversations with law enforcement officers throughout 2003-2004. 
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Health almost speaks another language, sometimes forgetting that what is grossly familiar 
to them sounds like medical jargon to others.   
Public health agencies are now required to utilize the Incident Command System 
structure and be National Incident Management System compliant.  Although the purpose 
of the Incident Command System is to have a standard emergency operating structure and 
language, some public health agencies have altered standard Incident Command System 
structure, further isolating themselves from other responder agencies.  National Incident 
Management System guidelines contribute to this by allowing a vast array of acceptable 
ICS structures and not requiring local or state agencies to at least collaborate with their 
partners in developing their ICS structures.  This is more problematic for public health 
agencies, who are the newcomers in developing their own structures.  
An additional barrier to interagency collaboration is that Public Health is staffed 
primarily by employees with biological science or healthcare-related backgrounds.  Other 
agencies, where personnel have different educational backgrounds in more diverse fields, 
may find public health personnel difficult to work with.  For example, many well-
educated law enforcement and fire department personnel have mentioned to the author 
that Public Health people are “academically elite and arrogant,” and that this makes them 
difficult and undesirable to work with.  This perceived arrogance affects other areas of 
collaboration as well.  Public health agencies generally lack experience in interagency 
collaboration and are frequently unaware of the expertise or educational resources other 
agencies have.   
Decision making is also usually more convoluted in Public Health.  In contrast 
with the command and control structures of other responder agencies, decision making in 
Public Health tends to take longer, and is often by consensus or committee.  Rarely can 
an immediate decision be made without conferring with several people.  This results in 
time delays when dealing with other agencies that need immediate decisions and reduces 
individual responsibility in decision making.  This contrasts with the command and 
control structures of many other agencies, especially military, fire and law enforcement 
agencies, that may find themselves frustrated with this decision-making style.  
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C.  PUBLIC HEALTH EXCLUSION BY OTHER RESPONDERS 
An additional barrier to public health integration and collaboration with 
Homeland Security partners is the exclusion of Public Health from planning and exercise 
activities.  Some of this may be due to ignorance of the role of public health agencies, or 
whether Public Health is even perceived to have a role in emergency incidents.  Some 
agencies, such as fire agencies, may see themselves in Public Health roles in addition to 
their usual responsibilities in emergencies.  However, this can be problematic, as Public 
Health roles have been well-defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
and Public Health officials have been trained in their specific disciplines, just as fire 
personnel have been in theirs.  This may be due to the lack of experience working with, 
or the frustration of working with, public health agencies, especially in emergency 
incidents.   
Some responder agencies have evolved in ways that isolate them from the general 
community.  Law enforcement agencies have long isolated themselves from the general 
public and from other agencies by a subculture of specific dress standards, organization, 
and paramilitary-like training.  This contrasts considerably with the public health 
organizational subculture, leading to barriers in initiating collaborative efforts. 
The primary activities that require collaboration between public health agencies 
and law enforcement agencies are investigation of and response to intentional disease 
outbreaks, activation of the Strategic National Stockpile, and standing up mass 
vaccination or medication dispensing clinics.  The importance of working with law 
enforcement agencies in planning for emergency incidents cannot be over-emphasized; in 
the end, they will be the agencies with jurisdictional control in emergency incidents.  
Likewise, public health agencies provide a resource to law enforcement agencies in their 
capabilities to recommend disease control prevention measures in response to potential 
disease exposures. 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, collaboration with law 
enforcement agencies in planning response activities and co-investigation of potential 
biological terrorist events has gained greater importance.   Public health agencies may 
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lack an understanding of how to interact with law enforcement agencies during criminal 
investigations and law enforcement agencies lack understanding as to the investigative 
needs of public health epidemiologists.  As a result, training in forensic epidemiology for 
both law enforcement and public health investigators has gained greater importance.38  
Other emergency planning activities have major law enforcement and public health 
components as well. 
Probably the greatest potential problem for public health agencies during 
emergency incidents is that law enforcement agencies will simply omit or delay 
notification of public health agencies.  After all, law enforcement has functioned 
perfectly well for the last several decades without too much contact with public health 
agencies; there has to be a good reason to do it now.  
Only by changing specific aspects of its organizational culture, such as 
communication and decision-making styles, can public health establish its credibility and 
be accepted as a partner agency in Homeland Security activities. Public health agencies 
must be willing to spend time working with and educating responders about public health 
resources.  Changing these ingrained characteristics will place demands on the adaptive 
capacities of public health agencies, and public health resistance to needed changes 
should be expected.   
D. SUMMARY  
Until Public Health acknowledges that Homeland Security is an important added 
focus, not a competing focus, will Public Health be able to be maximally effective in the 
Homeland Security venue.  Once this major disparity in focus is addressed, many other 
Public Health characteristics can be addressed through specialized training initiatives. 
Public health agencies must recognize the importance of working towards 
Homeland Security objectives and working as partners with other agencies.  Likewise, 
other responder agencies must be motivated to accept and include public health agencies 
                                                 
 
38 Richard A. Goodman, Judith W. Munson, Kim Dammers, Zita Lazzarini, and John P. Barkley, 
Forensic Epidemiology:  Law at the Intersection of Public Health and Criminal Investigations. Journal of 
Law, Medicine & Ethics, 31 (2003): 684-700. 
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as Homeland Security partners.  Unfortunately, in the absence of voluntary efforts on the 
part of different agencies, federal grant requirements and guidelines may be needed to 
accomplish this.   
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V. PROPOSED INITIATIVES 
This thesis proposes several initiatives, ranging from funding initiatives to 
recruitment and training initiatives.  The most difficult to implement are those affecting 
funding and priority policies at the federal and state levels.  The easiest are those that can 
occur at any level, but still require the support of public health leadership if they are to be 
effective. 
A.   FUNDING INITIATIVES 
Because of the latitude given to state public health agencies in determining how 
much funding is passed through to local levels, there is inconsistency in the ability of 
local public health agencies to fund their preparedness activities.  All emergencies are 
local, and the majority of funds should be focused locally to develop emergency capacity.  
Capacity building at the local Public Health level is more than just purchasing 
communications equipment and medical supplies.  Many hours must be spent 
collaborating with partner agencies in developing response plans and educating the public 
about emergency readiness.  This is time consuming not only initially, but requires a 
great deal of time to continually update plans, engage additional partners, and maintain 
relationships.  There are never sufficient numbers of personnel to accomplish the many 
existing tasks and develop initiatives to address new and varied objectives handed down 
from the federal government.   
To assist local public health agencies in capacity building, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention should consider limiting the amount of funding kept at the state 
level for state use.  Exceptions to this would be in states where the majority of local 
public health services are provided directly to the public by the state public health 
department.  Unless local public health agencies are adequately and appropriately funded, 
the foundation for national Public Health preparedness cannot be established.  
Public Health and responder agencies must be actively motivated to participate in 
joint planning initiatives that include public health agencies in emergency preparedness 
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and response activities.  Public health agencies are directed as part of their Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement goals 
to include partner agencies in their emergency preparedness activities.  Other responder 
agencies need to have the same requirement through their grant guidelines.  Since this has 
not yet consistently occurred, funding directives should include the necessity for 
documented inclusion of public health agencies in emergency management and 
preparedness activities.   
Before this can occur, it must be acknowledged and supported at the federal level 
that virtually all kinds of emergencies have public health components, and this support 
must be emphasized to emergency management and other responder agencies at the state 
level.  Public Health must be included in planning activities, not as an afterthought, but as 
a full partner.  For example, in the Arizona Homeland Security Regional Councils, Public 
Health was represented by a non-voting ad-hoc member prior to 2007, when this was 
finally changed.39  If federal agencies want Public Health to be full participants in 
Homeland Security objectives, then public health agencies must be treated as such at all 
levels of government.  Because change is often best facilitated by funding incentives, 
performance measures for Homeland Security funding can require partnerships with 
public health agencies as a requirement for grant funding. 
Local public health agencies must be given the flexibility in federal and state 
grants to allow the training of non-emergency preparedness personnel in basic emergency 
preparedness in order to develop workforce response capacities.  This may be 
accomplished by grant clauses that agree to allow these non-emergency grant-funded 
personnel a specified and generous amount of time for emergency preparedness training. 
B. TRANSFORMATIONAL INITIATIVES 
Effective and swift Public Health organizational transformation can only be 
accomplished with the support of federal, state, and local Public Health leadership.  First, 
they must recognize the importance and necessity of transformation if it is to maintain 
                                                 
 
39 Greg Manning, Regional Planner, Arizona Office of Homeland Security, presentation, December 
22, 2005. 
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and improve its effectiveness in the community as a Homeland Security partner.  Until 
Public Health leadership supports the acquisition of new skills and roles in supporting 
Homeland Security objectives, priorities in training and education of public health 
personnel and the implementation of programs outside traditional public health roles will 
be difficult to accomplish at local and state levels.   
Second, Public Health leadership at federal levels must provide the direction and 
mission consistent with best practices for organizational transformation for public health 
agencies to follow in implementing transformational strategies.  Without effective and 
supportive federal Public Health leadership guiding transformational strategies and 
objections, efforts to achieve state and local public health emergency preparedness goals 
will continue to be inconsistent.  Whatever the level of their readiness capabilities, public 
health agencies, especially those at the local level, are held responsible for the failures 
and successes in meeting emergency response needs.     
C. CULTURAL INITIATIVES 
Several initiatives can assist public health agencies in achieving organizational 
changes that will enable them to communicate, collaborate, and cooperate better with 
other responder agencies. 
First, federal, state, and local public health agencies should facilitate the 
recruitment of employees from diverse disciplines.  It is helpful to view and share 
dissimilar perspectives and knowledge bases in program development.  Especially 
desirable is the recruitment of personnel from emergency responder backgrounds.  Not 
only will these employees be able to ease interactions between agencies, they will assist 
public health employees in developing communication and perspectives that may be 
foreign to Public Health. 
Second, increase the time public health personnel spend interacting with other 
responder agency personnel.  This will assist in interagency understanding and 
knowledge of programs, priorities, and protocols.  It is important for public health 
personnel to learn about and acknowledge the validity of other agencies’ perspectives and 
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priorities.  While the time spent may be a considerable effort for Public Health and 
responder agencies, both will benefit by the increase in knowledge and familiarity with 
different types of agencies. 
Public Health must acknowledge that other responder agencies have a great deal 
of knowledge and expertise to offer.   Most of the emergency incidents that require Public 
Health response also require significant contributions by law enforcement, fire, and 
emergency management agencies.  It is far more likely those agencies will have greater 
experience in managing emergency incidents and their consequences than Public Health 
currently does. 
Third, public health agencies need to have a cadre of appropriately trained public 
health employees available for duty during non-business hours to address public health 
priority calls and emergency incidents.  There must be an organizational expectation that 
Public Health has emergency response functions and roles that must be addressed 
appropriately.  For this to be effective, however, other responder agencies must be aware 
of and trained in the need to notify public health agencies of emergency incidents that 
may have Public Health components.  Many times, public health agencies are excluded 
because responder agencies are not aware of the role public health agencies may play in 
emergency incidents or even what types of incidents may need Public Health 
involvement. For example, during wild land fires, health recommendations for people in 
the surrounding areas with certain chronic health conditions must be made based upon 
the amount of particulate matter or a visual smoke assessment. 
Fourth, Public Health leadership must give appropriately trained and trusted 
personnel decision-making authority — and support their decisions.  This may be 
difficult, as decision-making authority is often concentrated at higher organizational 
levels or made at lower levels based on consensus.  Unless trained public health 
emergency response personnel have the authority and knowledge to make timely and 
reasonable decisions, other responder agencies will continue to meet with frustration 
when working with public health agencies when immediate decisions are needed. 
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Training initiatives should include multiple approaches.  Local and state public 
health personnel should attend relevant trainings, especially those that are attended by 
other disciplines.  One example is Incident Command System training, where it is far 
more educational to attend trainings with other disciplines than to attend those attended 
by public health personnel exclusively.  Only by training with other disciplines will 
public health personnel begin to understand the perspectives and priorities of other 
agencies.  This will also assist Public Health in learning other agencies’ protocols and 
procedures, acronyms, and organizational structures.  Other agencies will benefit as well, 
by becoming familiar with Public Health roles and responses. 
Public health employees need to learn how to communicate effectively with other 
agencies.  Although training is often provided to public health employees on how to 
communicate with the media, they are poor at communications outside their immediate 
agencies.  Public health agencies also need to learn how to communicate with responders 
in emergencies.  Because they have, with few exceptions, had little exposure, public 
health personnel need to become familiar in how to effectively communicate with other 
people during emergency events 
Last, federal agencies would benefit by more exposure to local public health 
agency perspectives.    Too often, they are only aware of local Public Health activities 
and challenges by communicating indirectly through state public health agencies.  A 
program of regular site visits to and discussion with local public health agencies would 
help federal public health agencies to better measure and understand local challenges. 
Only by developing strategies at the federal level, and committing to implement 
them at the state and local levels, will these changes occur.  Although federal grant 
guidelines for public health preparedness require a system of training and exercises, they 
only require minimal interaction with other responder agencies.  It is far more effective to 
train and exercise with a diverse group of agencies regularly than to train within a 
familiar discipline.  For state and local public health agencies, it requires considerable 
effort and time to develop relationships with other responder agencies.  Sometimes these 
responders are unaware of the role of Public Health and may perceive that they have done 
quite well without public health participation.  State and local public health agencies must 
 40 
implement a consistent system of developing plans, exercises, and response activities 
with other types of responder agencies. 
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VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The funding initiatives suggested in the previous chapter primarily affect federal 
policies and emphasize the importance of local Public Health preparedness and response.  
Although Homeland Security grant dollars are determined by a different funding formula 
and strategy than is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Emergency 
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement funding, there is still an emphasis on preparedness 
at the local level.  Once federal funding for public health preparedness reaches the state 
level, it is up to the state health agencies to determine the amount of funding passed to 
local public health agencies.  This results in varying levels of funding actually reaching 
local agencies.  For example, in Arizona the state Homeland Security agency passes 80 
percent of Homeland Security grant funding through to local regional areas, while state 
public health passes only 50 percent to local public health agencies.  If local public health 
preparedness and response capacity is really considered to be a priority by the leadership 
at the federal public health level, then guidelines ensuring that funding will be directed to 
the local levels need to be developed.   
The need to prioritize local Public Health preparedness must be given increased 
importance by the federal government since all emergencies, including Public Health 
emergencies, are local.  While it can be argued that state public health agencies initially 
needed more funding to support state initiatives such as laboratory capacity enhancement 
and electronic reporting systems, these initiatives have been largely accomplished.  It is 
time for more funding to be directed at local public health agencies to build local Public 
Health preparedness and response capacity.   
Public health agencies must be supported as full partners by the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, and this support must be interpreted by state 
Homeland Security agencies as the need to include public health agencies at both the 
state and local levels in planning initiatives.  Some responder agencies may consider 
public health agencies competitors for diminishing Homeland Security funding, thereby 
excluding them from participation.  Other problems between agencies may arise due to 
crossover in responsibilities and roles of the agencies.  For example, Public Health 
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agencies and Emergency Management agencies are responsible for various volunteer 
recruitment and management activities.  These roles must be better defined at federal 
levels to eliminate the confusion and annoyance such crossover precipitates.   
Only by fully supporting public health  agencies as partners, and requiring state 
and local Homeland Security agencies to do the same, will local public health agencies be 
considered necessary partners by emergency management, law enforcement, and fire 
agencies. This will require leadership at Homeland Security agencies and public health 
agencies to support in policy and practice the importance of including public health 
agencies in Homeland Security activities.  Likewise, Public Health leadership will need 
to examine its priorities on the roles of Public Health during emergency incidents.  They 
will need to recognize the importance of developing sound strategies and objectives 
aimed at defining the appropriate roles of public health agencies so that it is clear to other 
responder agencies that Public Health is a valued response partner.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Public health leadership at federal levels can directly improve the ability of public 
health agencies to integrate into the Homeland Security community by developing a 
national strategy to effect transformational changes in the very nature and function of 
Public Health.  This must be done at the federal level so that compliance and 
implementation will be effective at state and local levels.  Federal level implementation is 
necessary for two reasons.  First, broad guidelines can be established for state and local 
public health agencies, building more consistent policies throughout state and local 
governments.  Second, the federal government controls the funding for public health 
emergency preparedness and response programs, thereby controlling the implementation 
of state and local public health practices.   
Public health agencies have not yet built the integration they need with other 
local, state, and federal agencies in order to effectively fulfill their Homeland Security 
objectives.  If this integration is not accomplished, public health agencies will fail to meet 
their emergency preparedness goals.  Their failure will result in significant negative 
results during emergency incidents.   
Failure to target the majority of federal funding to local public health agencies is a 
major cause of the limited success of public health agencies.  Without success in 
completing Homeland Security objectives at the local level, there can only be very 
limited success at state and federal levels. Agency partnerships in planning and response 
activities are developed first at the local level and require extensive and time-consuming 
outreach and participation on the part of local public health agencies.  Without these 
partnerships, local public health agencies will not ever become valued resources for other 
responder agencies.  For this reason, federal public health emergency preparedness 
dollars must be focused on developing local public health capacity. 
The failure of response agencies to include public health agencies in planning 
initiatives and other emergency preparedness activities is another reason for Public 
Health lagging in completing Homeland Security objectives.  Federal Homeland Security 
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agencies must support and emphasize the importance of federal, state, and local Public 
Health involvement at all levels of emergency preparedness and response.  If responder 
agencies such as emergency management, law enforcement, and fire agencies exclude 
local Public Health from these activities, local public health agencies will continue to be 
hampered in their efforts to integrate into the Homeland Security community.   
Accomplishing Homeland Security goals requires extensive interagency 
collaboration.   Public health agencies have many tasks to complete — such as enhancing 
isolation and quarantine procedures; disease detection and control; emergency plans; 
developing and implementing exercises for specific disease threats such as anthrax, 
smallpox, and pandemic influenza; chemical events; natural disaster events; and mass 
vaccination and medication dispensing clinics — in which they need the assistance of 
other agencies.  In order to be maximally effective in contributing to Homeland Security 
objectives, all public health agencies must willingly collaborate with multiple agencies in 
planning for interoperable communications; vulnerability assessments for health, water, 
agriculture and power infrastructure; and emergency response activities.  Education, 
exercise, and joint planning initiatives can do much to strengthen interagency working 
relationships. 
Public health agencies must also overcome internal organizational barriers to 
interagency collaboration and coordination if they are to interact more effectively with 
other responder agencies that are involved in Homeland Security activities.  To 
accomplish this, Public Health leadership will need to recognize and acknowledge that 
achieving Homeland Security objectives is a public health priority.  Homeland Security 
objectives cannot be weighed against, or be considered a competing priority, with other 
public health programs.  Preparedness and response initiatives are an important part of 
local Public Health infrastructure and should be given the priority required by federal 
funding agreements. Once this major disparity in focus is addressed, other organizational 
characteristics that hinder public health integration can be addressed through specialized 
training and education initiatives. 
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